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In this exploratory research, I develop new knowledge on trust in inter-firm cooperation that leverages recent 
technologies such as blockchain and the Internet of things in a digital platform ecosystem. In a digital network, advanced 
algorithms govern and shape inter-firm business processes. While such algorithms introduce efficiency in inter-firm 
business processes, their limitations, especially their apparent lack of transparency, may affect the key trust dimensions 
(i.e., reliability, fairness, and goodwill) in the relationships among the participating firms. I introduce algorithmic 
relationship, a label that embeds the concepts of smart contracts in inter-firm cooperation. Algorithmic relationships 
involve autonomous and semi-autonomous implementations of smart contracts in all lifecycle stages of inter-firm 
cooperation. By analyzing extant literature on trust, inter-firm cooperation, business model innovation, and digital 
platforms, I demonstrate how various factors influence whether firms adopt smart contracts: perceptions about other 
participants’ trustworthiness, participants’ own propensity to trust, participants’ shared goals and resource 
embeddedness in the network, perceived risks in inter-firm interactions, and complexity and time criticality of inter-firm 
interactions. Taking a temporal perspective, I also recognize the present lacunae with smart contracts from various 
perspectives (algorithm development, algorithm implementation, algorithm governance, and the availability of 
appropriate legal resources in the event that disputes occur) and demonstrate how these drawbacks impede shared 
value creation. 
Keywords: Algorithmic Relationships, Blockchain, Internet of Things, Inter-firm Cooperation, Smart Contracts,Trust.  
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1 Introduction 
As traditional vertical value chains in business ecosystems give way to loosely coupled coalition and 
multisided platforms, business have increasingly begun to rely on smart contract technology to promote 
effective cooperation with other firms in value stakeholder networks (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005; 
Pagani, 2013). To better understand this phenomena, I present and discuss the concept of “algorithmic 
relationships”. In this paper, I discuss algorithmic relationships—which I define as codified rules embedded 
in a digital device network that manage an arrangement among firms that participate in exchanging and 
sharing resources and/or co-developing products and services—as a way to better explain these new forms 
of cooperation with other firms in a value stakeholder network.  
Firms that pursue innovation in their business models have begun to explore blockchain-based smart 
contracts to create and capture value through adopting newer technologies. A blockchain is a distributed 
ledger for maintaining persistent and tamper-proof record of transactional data. It functions as a 
decentralized database that a network of collaborating partners manages. A smart contract, a self-executing 
contract, is a software-based transaction on a blockchain that digitally enforces, verifies, or facilitates a 
contract between two or more parties. Thus, while blockchain may promote trust among parties via truthfully 
executing code, business collaborations in general and inter-firm business processes in particular can use 
smart contracts to implement business collaborations  (Mendling et al., 2018). Blockchain’s potential 
application in various business transactions alongside artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), the 
Internet of things (IoT), and 5G communication technologies has led management scholars and technology 
consultants to examine the technology’s business benefits and practical implementation in intra-firm and 
inter-firm business processes. While firms have increasingly developed and invested in these autonomous 
inter-firm business interface solutions over the years, their adoption in several industry sectors remains 
moderate (Columbus, 2019). Janssen, Weerakkody, Ismagilova, Sivarajah, and Irani (2020)  identified that 
technical, market, and institutional factors that deter firms from adopting technologies such as blockchain 
but that the reference literature has predominantly dealt with technological issues and cultural aspects such 
as resistance to technology adoption. As such, we do not sufficiently understand how inter-firm trust shapes 
value co-creation in technology-enabled business processes. As Etzioni (2019) points out, trust plays a 
crucial role in commercial transactions and for economic activity in general, and, considering the  fact that 
that businesses and individuals tend to trust apparent strangers in popular cyber platforms such as Uber, 
Airbnb, and so on, we need to better understand the role trust plays in digital platforms, what factors enhance 
it, and what factors deter it.  
In this paper, I do not review how firms have applied blockchain and smart contracts (for a review, see Yli-
Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park, & Smolander, 2016; Casino, Dasaklis, & Patsakis, 2019). Instead, following a 
phenomenon-based research approach (Krogh et al., 2012), I develop a new perspective on trust in inter-
firm cooperation by reflecting on some key questions associated with technology-based smart contracts in 
digital platforms and go beyond the technology’s implementation issues and business benefits. Using 
classical trust model (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) and technology acceptance models (Lee, Kozar, 
& Larsen, 2003; Söllner, Hoffmann, & Leimeister, 2016) as references, I discuss whether algorithmic 
relationships embed the key elements of traditional inter-firm cooperation and, thus, value co-creation. As 
firms increasingly adopt advanced technologies, they can expect smart contracts to complement and 
supplement, if not replace, their existing contracts and agreements. Consequently, firms can anticipate 
algorithmic relationships to appear across their vertical and horizontal boundaries. In this paper, I develop 
new knowledge on trust in “trust-free” digital networks by synthesizing insights from different domains. The 
results not only help address the knowledge gap on technology’s role in trust, but also provide future 
directions towards developing global standards in technology-enabled inter-firm processes.  
Inter-firm cooperation results from the choices firms make about market transactions and internalization in 
seeking to capitalize on and increase their capabilities and endowments while minimizing costs (Combs & 
Ketchen, 1999). Such cooperation takes multiple forms that range from transactional cooperation in which 
firms exchange resources and information in the value chain to alliances and joint ventures in which firms 
collaborate to pursue a shared vision. In the past decade, we have witnessed myriad newer forms of inter-
firm cooperation through digital platform ecosystems where multiple firms create, deliver, and capture value 
through collaboration using technological solutions. By participating in and orchestrating such digital 
platform ecosystems, firms add new dimensions to inter-firm relationships. Computer algorithms now largely 
shape and govern these relationships. Some pertinent issues in such algorithmic relationships relate to the 
mechanisms through which firms form these relationships and, consequently, how these algorithmic 
relationships alter the role of trust in inter-firm cooperation (Hawlitschek, Notheisen, & Teubner, 2018).    
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This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I review business models, inter-firm cooperation, and trust’s 
role in inter-firm cooperation, especially in sharing economy business models (SEBMs). In Section 3, I 
introduce the technological transformations, which blockchain and the IoT drive, that have lead 
organizations to adopt algorithmic relationships that manifest via smart contracts. In Section 4, based on 
my findings from reviewing the extant research, I develop several perspectives with which to view trust in 
algorithmic relationships among firms. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss emergent challenges, suggest paths 
for future research, and conclude the paper.      
2 Trust and Shared Value Creation through Inter-firm Business 
Processes 
A business model constitutes a firm’s architecture for its value-creation, value-delivery, and value-capture 
mechanisms the complementarity among the activities that underlie these mechanisms (Osterwalder & 
Pigneur, 2010; Foss & Saebi, 2018). These mechanisms also involve cooperation and collaboration with 
other business entities at varying complexity, interdependency, and payoff levels—from formal joint venture 
engagements at one end of the spectrum to arms-length market transactions at the other end. Firms can 
gain many benefits from inter-firm cooperation, such as activities with a broader scale and scope, shared 
costs and risks, improved ability to deal with complexity, enhanced learning effects that lead to improved 
returns on research and development (R&D) investments, and enhanced flexibility and efficiencies and a 
shorter time to market. The factors that help firms realize these gains include resource commitment, 
reciprocal trust, conflict-resolution techniques, and relational embeddedness (Squire, Cousins, & Brown, 
2009). Thus, the level at which firms participate with other firms depends on not only their own resources 
and capabilities but also their strategic intent, which may co-evolve with changes in their business model, 
environment, and managemerial performance (Koza & Lewin, 1998). In addition, various governance 
mechanisms (e.g., a priori incentive structures, internal and collaborative monitoring processes, contractual 
provisions, reputations, norms, interpersonal and inter-organizational trust) coordinate and motivate parties’ 
exchange activities (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Jap & Anderson, 2003). The source of inter-organizational 
competitive advantage lies in relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary 
resources and capabilities, and effective relationship governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Firms’ approach to 
sense operational-level complementarities and sustain organizational commitment through adhering to 
formal contracts and creating informal understanding also influences effective governance during an inter-
firm cooperation’s execution stage (Wu & Cavusgil, 2006).  
Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712) define trust as:  
Willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the action of another party based on the expectation 
that the other will perform a particular action important to the trust or, irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that other party.  
This definition has three key elements: 1) an actor’s willingness to be vulnerable, 2) the expectation that the 
other party will perform an important action, and 3) the practical inability to control the other party. These 
elements constitute Mayer et al.’s (1995) trust model, which also include the trustor’s propensity to trust and 
the other party’s perceived trustworthiness. Emergent trust leads to each party’s willingness to take risks in 
the relationship and drives its outcomes. Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007) later identified additional 
dimensions in the trust model; namely, control systems, context specificity, reciprocity, time dimension, 
affective responses, and repair of trust post-violation. 
Some early literature on transaction cost economics argued that a firm’s decision to internalize a business 
activity or to outsource it to a partner depends on the cost of the transaction at hand and that trust might 
have minimal role in situations with unambiguous interests and interaction processes (Williamson, 1993, in 
Farrell, 2009). However, given the network aspects in many contemporary business environments in which 
actors’ interests “encapsulate” their partners’ interests, trust has a more critical and relevant role in inter-
firm relationships today (Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Farrell, 2009; Özer, Subramanian, & Wang, 2017).  
Several inter-organizational factors influence trust in inter-firm relationships: 1) contractual control, 2) 
inherent information asymmetry, 3) costly relationship-specific investments, and 4) adverse events. First, 
contractual control enhances outcomes’ verifability and makes it easier to detect divergence, which leads 
to efficient rational inference about partners and strengthens trust in inter-firm relationships (Lumineau, 
2017). Second, inherent information asymmetry describes situations when one party has access to greater 
material knowledge than the other party, which enables the former to accrue better gains from the 
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relationship. Information asymmetry in inter-firm relationships leads to incomplete contracts; thus, 
contractual coordination, as opposed to contractual control, encourages parties to cohesively interpret 
objectives, reinforces information sharing, and allows for feedback and contingency plans(Baudry, 1998; 
Lumineau, 2017). Third, costly relationship-specific investments by a partner may serve to signal its 
trustworthiness (Beer, Ahn, & Leider, 2017). Such investments provide benefits only in the collaboration 
with a specific partner and may include investments in IT infrastructure or other physical assets. Fourth, 
when adverse events unrelated to the inter-firm relationship impact the business performance of one entity, 
the probability that partners will defect increases due to high stigmatization risks, associated sunk cost, and 
loss of value-creation opportunities (Bruyaka, Philippe, & Castañer, 2018).    
In a platform ecosystem, economic value exchange among participants takes a hybrid form as they integrate 
value co-creation and capture mechanisms at different levels (i.e., strategy, processes, and systems) 
(Puschmann & Alt, 2016). We can attribute multi-sided platform business models’ success to their 
complexity and the fact that they simultaneously use both innovation and imitation to create highly intricate 
activity systems (Zhao, Von Delft, Morgan-Thomas, & Buck, 2019). An inter-firm network in such an 
environment enables stronger knowledge-spillover mechanisms as the heterogeneity of knowledge 
distributed across clusters in the network enhances the degree to which participants work together to use 
knowledge (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Inter-firm cooperation’s flexible arrangements via networks and 
platforms that use digital ecosystems that go beyond the dyadic choice between markets and hierarchies 
ensure that social capital in the networks mitigate transaction costs through reciprocity and trust, while digital 
solutions help partners scale their return on their investments (Gulati, 1998; Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 
1999; Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2019). Additionally, the level of trust among actors moderates how effectively 
they transfer knowledge in the network, and social processes such as backward-looking elements (i.e., prior 
alliance experience with a partner and reputation), current interactions (i.e., communication, cultural 
sensitivity), and forward-looking elemens such as expected relationship length should produce trust (Squire 
et al., 2009; Khalid & Ali, 2017). 
To summarize, effective inter-firm cooperation, especially in platform ecosystems, requires trust among 
players, legitimacy, and shared goals. These elements positively influence network cohesion and resilience, 
which, in turn, positively influence alliance performance. In other words, distributed trust not only transforms 
organizations’ boundaries but also challenges assumptions about internalizing organizational functions 
(Seidel, 2018).  
With the above observations, I extract a high-level process flow of inter-firm cooperation that represents 
inter-firm cooperation in various forms—from closely linked joint ventures and arms-length alliances to 
supplier-buyer relationships and outsourcing—that apply to traditional inter-firm cooperation and sharing 
economy business models. I illustrate the multi-stage process flow with mechanisms at each stage in Figure 
1. Several important factors can influence the interactions’ effectiveness. First, the quasi integration between 
firms can be vertical on value chain function or horizontal on time scale. Second, information asymmetry 
that continues to exist between partners result in bounded rationality and influence specific actions at micro-
level in a process element. Finally, the opportunistic behavior from actors’ representatives may lead to sub-
optimal performance in the overall relationship.  
In Section 3, I explore how recent technologies such as blockchain and the IoT have begun to transform 
business models and inter-firm interactions. Subsequently, in Section 4, I develop new perspectives on trust  
in technology-enabled inter-firm cooperation. 
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Figure 1. Generic Lifecycle and Process Flow of Inter-organizational Engagement 
3 Technology-enabled Business Model Transformation 
Business model innovation relates to novel changes that firms introduce into their value-creation, value-
capture and value-delivery activities and the complementary relations between them (Foss & Saebi, 2018). 
As external and the internal environments evolve over time, a firm innovates its business model by 
anticipating and respond to the sequence of voluntary and emergent changes in its business’s core 
components (Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Teece, 2014). Such business model innovation may also guide the 
firm to explore cooperative relationships with other firms and potentially leverage one another’s resources 
and capabilities to enhance how well their value chain activities perform, which can lead to superior value 
creation and an inter-organizational competitive advantage. 
While several roadmaps for business model innovation exist, digitalization over the past two decades has 
prompted firms to apply technological innovation to evolve their business models for improved value creation 
and enhanced inter-firm cooperation. Business model transformation refers to the significant changes that 
a firm makes to any or several components of its business model such that it significantly alters its value 
proposition to its customers, its business processes, its cost structure, and its revenue streams. Firms 
typically begin digitally transforming their business model with “digital sensing”, which external triggers 
enable, and then perform “digital seizing”, which includes rapid prototyping and the creation of digital 
business portfolios (Warner & Wäger, 2019). External developments drive and internal enablers and barriers 
moderate these two processes (i.e., digital sensing and seizing). Digital transformation eventually leads to 
the strategic renewal of a firm’s business model and novel mechanisms for inter-firm cooperation. In a 
nutshell, a digital platform ecosystem integrates cooperative value-creation logic, value-capture 
mechanisms, and value-delivery architecture in a value stakeholder network (Al-Debai & Avison, 2010). 
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Blockchain and the Internet of things (IoT) represent two recent technological breakthroughs that can 
transform the way firms cooperate. These technologies have given rise to blockchain-based shared 
economy business models (BSEBMs), which have a highly decentralized nature compared to conventional 
SEBMs in digital platform ecosystems (Tumasjan & Beutel, 2019). In Section 3.1, I focus on role that these 
two technologies play in business model innovation and inter-firm cooperation. 
Though business-to-business integration through legacy technologies such as electronic data exchange 
(EDI) has been in place for several decades, blockchains’ distributed ledger technology enhances the 
integration functionality. As the in-built reconciliation process in a blockchain eliminates the need for 
trustworthy intermediaries, business processes become less complex and faster, which makes 
disintermediation a key benefit that blockchain provides. Thus, blockchain can potentially alter a firm’s 
business model by authenticating transactions in real time, facilitating disintermediation, enabling a fault-
tolerant security model, and codifying not only the contractual engagement terms but also the ethics and 
integrity dimensions into its business processes, which can improve operational efficiency and reduce moral 
hazards (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017; Lacity, 2018). Because peer-to-peer networks with no central system 
transmit transactions securely and cost-effectively, one can expect them to strengthen inter-firm ties in the 
supply chain (Korpella, Hallikas, & Dahlberg, 2017; Morkunas, Paschen, & Boon, 2019). Secure information 
sharing and improved visibility build trust, which lead to operational improvements in inter-organizational 
processes (Wang, Singgih, Wang, & Rit, 2019). Thus, blockchain-based solutions provide an ideal 
opportunity for inter-firm business processes that require shared common database with an objective and 
immutable log, that have multiple partners with conflicting objectives, that have different rules and trust 
barriers, and that require firms to avoid intermediaries or third parties (Lacity, 2018; Pedersen, Risius, & 
Beck, 2019).     
One can categorize blockchains according to 1) whether they adopt public or private access to transactions 
and 2) whether they adopt permissioned or permissionless transaction validation. While the cryptocurrency 
domain features many more permissionless public blockchains, permissioned blockchains suit inter-firm 
business processes where actors know one another’s identity. Thus, the participating actors in a 
permissioned blockchain strive to foster collaboration among themselves with agreed-on validators and 
other enforcing systems to maintain the ledger. In contrast, more efficient consensus algorithms such as 
proof-of-stake consensus algorithms rather than mining drive network maintenance. The value of the stored 
data in the permissioned blockchains still depends on its unambiguity, which fostersparticipants’ common 
interests and sense of togetherness (Zheng, Xie, Dai, Chen, & Wang, 2018). 
The other recent industrial breakthrough, the IoT, helps connect a broad spectrum of physical devices in 
and between organizations to automate tasks and transform business models with the premise that anything 
can be connected with everything else to exchange data (Shim et al., 2019). Blockchain-enabled IoT 
solutions integrate, automate, record, and validate human-machine as and machine-to-machine interactions 
in a distributed environment that may not have a central authority or central data repository (Huckle, 
Bhattacharya, White, & Beloff, 2016). Even though businesses have transformed from traditional models to  
digital business models through IT-based business processes, BSEBMs may help an ecosystem to further 
evolve with seemless interfacing of decentralized business processes across organizations. Thus, BSEBMs 
pose different challenges from the more prevalent, centralized sharing economy platforms such as Uber 
and Airbnb (Chong, Lim, Hua, Zheng, & Tan, 2019; Tumasjan & Beutel, 2019). 
Blockchain solutions coupled with the IoT have key characteristics such as disintermediation, 
decentralization, persistency, transparency and immutability, auditability, trustless exchange, increased 
user control of information, secure decentralized networks, and the ability to maintain high-quality and 
accurate data with device-level connectivity (Zheng et al., 2018). While these features have the potential to 
transform any business model, the diversity of technological implementations and features present hard 
interoperability issues that hinder standardization. Some key issues that require investigation include: 1) 
addressing blockchain technological limitations such as throughput and latency in managing high-speed 
transaction-oriented business processes in and across organizations; 2) managing the cultural shift and 
addressing trust issues in blockchain adoption; 3) developing consensus on decision rights, accountability, 
and incentive-structuring issues; 4) formalizing ambiguous business protocols; and 5) examining 
governance in decentralized autonomous organizations (Beck, Müller-Bloch, & King, 2018; Mendling et al., 
2018; Rossi, Müller-Bloch, Thatcher, & Beck, 2019; Waltl, Sillaber, Gallersdörfer, & Matthes, 2019). Thus, 
we can expect organizations to adopt blockchain technology and realize concomitant value slowly and in a 
staged fashion since they need to coordinate across across organizational boundaries and must contend 
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with a complex  technological, regulatory, and social landscape  (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017; Casino et al., 
2019; Riasanow, Burckhardt, Soto Setzke, Böhm, & Krcmar, 2018; Hughes et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019).  
Notwithstanding the role of technology, humans have a critical role in designing, developing, and governing 
the symbiotic relationship among firms in a digital platform ecosystem. Employees in organizations with 
complex adaptive systems may develop the capabilities to produce effective mechanisms to develop, 
produce, and rapidly distribute technology solutions. Such contributions from humans enable firms to evolve 
as autonomous, synchronized, and interactive units. As Pazaitis, De Filippi, and Kostakis (2017) argue, 
while technology can facilitate distributed systems to scale and become viable, the genuine dynamics of 
sharing and the underlying human sociality should guide efforts to design and deploy technological 
solutions. Accordingly, I explore the emergence of autonomous inter-firm transactions in Section 3.1. In 
Figure 2, I present an illustrative digital platform ecosystem that involves supply chain functions with multiple 
business entities and their interactions on the platform as a reference for the following discussion. While the 
list and the flow of activities have a representative nature, the diagram underscores the importance of inter-
firm cooperation in creating and capturing value and how information sharing and decision-making occur 
across organizational boundaries. Some activities in this schematic belong to the ecosystem’s public model, 
whereas other activities can belong to an individual actor’s private model. The platform may choose an 
orchestrator-based execution in which a key central player orchestrates how different participants move, or 
it can operate as a decentralized choreography in which players coordinate activities autonomously 
(Carminati, Ferrari, & Rondanini, 2018). Also note that the firms in the platform may choose to execute a 
part of their inter-firm transactions on an autonomous smart contract that runs on a blockchain using 
business modeling execution language, while they can perform their remaining activities “off the chain” 
(Fdhila, Rinderle-Ma, Knuplesch, & Reichert, 2015). 
3.1 Smart Contracts and Algorithmic Relationships in Digital Platform Ecosystems 
Traditionally, researchers have described an algorithm as: 
A finite procedure, written in a fixed symbolic vocabulary, governed by precise instructions, 
moving in discrete steps, whose execution requires no insight, cleverness, intuition, intelligence, 
or perspicuity, and that sooner or later comes to an end. (Berlinsky, 2000, in Zia, Kauffman, & 
Niiranen, 2012). 
While algorithms have existed in business software for decades and primarily focused on solving 
computational problems, organizations have begun to move towards algorithmic and autonomous decision 
making in business process as they adopt digital technologies, which leads to advanced automation (Gasser 
& Almeida, 2017). Consequently, smart contracts—software systems that conditionally enforce contract 
clauses—now govern many inter-firm business processes. Being disintermediated and self-sustained, they 
promise increased commercial efficiency, reduced transaction and legal costs, and anonymous transacting 
to organizations engaged in a contract (Giancaspro, 2017; Savelyev, 2017). Applying agency theory, we 
may see a smart contract as an organizational agent: an organization (the principal) authorizes the 
algorithm’s decisions, and the algorithm’s decisions bound the organization. As an engine for auto-
enforceable smart contracts that “machine consensus” powers, Blockchain could, in essence, disrupt 
traditional governance structures by reducing bureaucracy via reducing transaction costs, solving principal-
agent issues, and reducing subsequent moral hazards (Shermin, 2017). However, firms can also execute a 
smart contract in a centralized hub-and-spoke network without implementing a blockchain solution.  
Some business functions where smart contracts may proliferate include areas with a greater purpose and 
urgency for reliable, automatable, information-sharing networks, such as when firms need to 1) provide 
extended visibility and traceability to stakeholders; 2) simplify, digitalize, and optimize global supply chain 
operations; 3) automate shipment validation; and 4) abolish disintermediation to improve efficiency (Wang 
et al., 2019).  
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Implementing smart contracts follows a layered approach where the technical layer deals with data 
management, algorithms, and standards, the logical layer deals with the criteria and principles, and the 
social and legal layer deals with norms, regulations, and legislations. A firm can deploy a business network 
model (BNM) using business process execution language (BPEL) to conduct setup activities, form proto-
contracts, and negotiate contracts in an electronic collaborator community (Norta, 2015). One can define 
BNM as the blueprint of an electronic community of firms engaged in inter-firm collaboration. It captures the 
roles and business processes that pertain to a business scenario and contains legally valid template 
contracts whose relevant parameters firms can fill in in during automated negotiations. To improve a 
deployed contract’s trustworthiness and fairness, researchers suggest that smart contracts use fiduciary 
nodes or observers as participants who can ensure transparency and data provenance through a verifiable 
audit trail (Angrish, Craver, Hasan, & Starly, 2018).   
While smart contracts have drawn attention from practitioners and technology enthusiasts, they have 
several limitations in how firms can conceive of and implement them in inter-organizational business 
processes. They are egalitarian and may appear just and fair to all parties; however, issues with smart 
contracts range from legal implications to the fact that algorithmic decisions lack the nuance that a human 
mind can offer. For example, letting algorithms dynamically determine the terms in a contract through ML 
may lead to a possible situation that the algorithm’s creator did not foresee, especially with bounded 
parameters in the decision-making universe. Consequently, the algorithm may choose actions that a human 
would consider incorrect or illegal. Also, since code encapsulates the terms, courts cannot interpret the 
actual content and may have to rely on extrinsic material. The argument that algorithmic smart contracts not 
only improve operational efficiency but also address contract enforcement’s ethical and integrity dimensions 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) makes a strong assumption about the developed algorithm’s fairness. However, 
considering ML algorithms’ opacity and dynamic learning process, potential questions regarding their 
transparency and, consequently, their fairness arise. Thus, we need to address the transparency angle to 
claim algorithm’s ethical superiority. 
I classify these challenges, especially with respect to trust, into three temporal dimensions: 1) trust ex ante, 
2) trust through the platform ecosystem’s governance, and 3) trust ex post. In Table 1, I summarize some 
key issues that extant research has identified and categorize them according to the three dimensions. In 
the table, I also provide pointers as to how I address these issues in Section 4. 
Table 1. Limitations of Smart Contracts in Improving Inter-organizational Relationship 
Relationship 
dimension 
Challenges in current implementation / conceptualization of smart 
contracts 
My approach to resolve 
the issues 




The fundamental assumptions that each algorithm engrains about 
behavior rules, intelligence, creative decision making, learning, 
uncertainty, and so on constrain the way one can model self-organized, 
adaptive complex systems (Zia et al., 2012). In addition, algorithms’ in-
built opacities (see the next point in this table) limit their transparency to 
stakeholders ex ante; in particular, non-tech-savvy business owners can 
develop concerns about embedded contract rules’ accuracy (Burrell, 
2016). 
When two partners engage in transactions, they may perceive two types 
of risks: 1) the risk that the other partner does not commit themselves to 
joint efforts due to self-interest and payoff inequity and 2) the risk that 
participants do not meet their objectives due to external hazards despite 
their best interests (Das & Teng, 1996).   
I break down the smart 
contract adoption 
challenges to the following 
dimensions: 1) 
participant’s propensity to 
trust, 2) perceived 
trustworthiness of the 
platform and other 
participants, 3) process-
level and resource-level 
interconnectedness in 
transactions, and 4) how 
one can design contracts 
via algorithms such that 
participants better accept 
them.    
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While algorithms may make objective and, thus, potentially fairer 
decisions compared to the decisions that humans make, algorithmic 
decision making has received criticism for its potential to enhance 
discrimination, information and power asymmetry, and opacity (Lepri, 
Oliver, Letouzé, Pentland, & Vinck, 2018).  
Specifically, information asymmetry between a smart contract’s 
developers and stakeholders, and stakeholders’ inability to establish 
causal relationships hinder stakeholders from arriving at a normative 
consensus (i.e., what is desirable and what is not is not clear) (Zia et al., 
2012).  
In addition, as business circumstances change, protocols and rules can 
become inappropriate for the new environment and require modification. 
However, by principle, modifying blockchain code occurs through 
majority consensus; thus, if stakeholders who may have unaligned 
interests in a distributed multi‐stakeholder network face great complexity 
in reaching consensus, then it may lead to additional agency issues 
(Shermin, 2017).  
It is also difficult to transpose legal rules’ ambiguity and flexibility into 
formalized language that machines can interpret (De Filippi & Hassan, 
2018; Werbach, 2018a). 
Appropriate governance frameworks need to include provisions on the 
respective parties’ liability, rules to approve/reject authorized 
participants, correction mechanisms, and applicable law in case disputes 
arise (Janssen et al., 2020) 
I identify causes that lead 
to managerial and 
process issues in 
algorithm-based 





ex post, legal 
recourse 
ML algorithms are more complex and dynamic than the structured rules 
engines from years past: they learn constantly and decide heuristically, 
which can lead to poor explainability and transparency. Explainability 
refers to the degree to which AI can translate how it operates in human 
terms to users, and transparency refers to the degree to which a user 
can clearly see how an algorithm makes decisions (Robert, Bansal, & 
Lütge, 2020).  
Thus, different types of opacities—such as intentional opacity (when an 
algorithm’s inventors focus on protecting their intellectual property), 
illiterate opacity (when people lack the technical skills to understand how 
an algorithm, works), and intrinsic opacity (when certain ML methods 
such as deep-learning techniques prevent one from easily interpreting 
them)—collectively and significantly affect stakeholders’ ability to accept 
a smart contract’s causal outcomes (Burrell, 2016; Scholz, 2017). In 
essence, a smart contract becomes a black box algorithmic agent that 
can act far beyond their authorizing entities’ intent and capability and, 
thus, exceed the mandate that they bestow on it. 
While a participant cannot breach a smart contract, a smart contract may 
not create obligation in its legal meaning, and illegal smart contracts can 
arise since vitiated consent or intent does not nullify smart contract’s 
validity (Savalyev, 2017). Thus, when disputes arise, the current legal 
system may provide little recourse to contract participants as technology 
attempts to provide an alternative, deterministic solution.  
I explore the dichotomy of 
whether code should be 
more like the law or 
whether the law should be 
more like code. I also 
investigate the temporal 
effect that inter-firm 
cooperation experience 




A smart contract-based organization constitutes a a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)—a 
virtual organization on the Internet that raises internal capital from investors and carries out its business 
decisions and value chain activities autonomously through algorithmic governance by leveraging blockchain 
technology. When necessary, it also relies on hiring individuals or on outsourcing to perform certain tasks 
that the automaton itself cannot do. While the concepts behind DAO are interesting and differ significantly 
from today’s formal organizations, they also underestimate the nuances of intra- and inter-organizational 
transactions and the important role that humans play in them. Indeed, given The DAO’s (a specific DAO 
implementation) failure, we can better appreciate the potential of algorithmic decision making, the fallibility 
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of incentive design and modeling actions, the limitations of fully autonomous governance, and the role of 
legal authority (DuPont, 2017).  
Based on the above discussion, one needs to ask how effectively “trust-free” technology solutions in digital 
platform ecosystems shape and govern inter-firm relationships and contribute to shared value creation. In 
particular, I focus on exploring the role that trust plays in these new sharing economy business models that 
use technology-based autonomous inter-firm interactions with or without blockchain technology (i.e., 
BSEBMs or SEBMs). Here, one needs to recognize that firms may want to consider smart contracts, 
encryption, and distributed ledgers separately (i.e., firms may not want to completely implement blockchain 
and still have a smart contract to improve productivity in the platform) (Halaburda, 2018). In Section 4, I 
develop a perspective that integrates my findings from analyzing the literature on trust, smart contracts, and 
the implementation of smart contracts in business models. 
4 Developing New Perspectives on Trust in Technology-enabled Inter-
firm Cooperation in Platforms 
In this section, I synthesize extant knowledge on trust in autonomous inter-firm interactions. The way in 
which firms conceptualize trust differs substantially among traditional inter-firm cooperations, sharing 
economy-based platform collaborations, and the most advanced blockchain-based digital platforms. In a 
traditional environment, a firm develops trust in a partner based on the partner’s ability, benevolence, and 
integrity and on its own propensity to trust based on its past experience, leadership traits, and overall culture 
(Mayer et al., 1995). The original technology acceptance model (TAM) (Lee et al., 2003) that recognizes 
four major constructs (i.e., perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, behavioral intention, and behavior) 
may not be able to address the additional challenges that inter-organizational tensions and constraints offer. 
The trust TAM that Söllner et al. (2016) have proposed recognizes the role that trust plays in information 
systems, the technology provider, and the user community. However, trust relationships in a platform 
microeconomy can be more complex than what the trust TAM captures (Glaser, Hawlitschek, & Notheisen, 
2019). In the sharing economy, the concept of the trust TAM involves dimensions encompassing trust 
among peers in the network, trust in platform, trust in products or services, and trust in the combination of 
these dimensions. On the other hand, blockchain-based networks promise as a “trust-free” technology 
based on algorithms’ technological prowess to replace trusted third parties such as platform intermediaries 
(Hawlitschek, Notheisen, & Teubner, 2018).  
Using the classical trust framework that Mayer et al. (1995) developed and additional perspectives from 
Schoorman et al. (2007) as a reference, I redefine the role that trust plays in algorithmic relationships (i.e., 
inter-firm collaboration with autonomous or semi-autonomous smart contracts). I root my framework in the 
extant knowledge on how organizations design, deploy, govern, and adapt inter-firm processes in platform 
economy business models, which makes it more specific than the enhanced trust TAM that Söllner et al. 
(2016) proposed.   
4.1 Trust in Algorithmic Relationships Ex Ante 
Considering the focus on “trust-free” interactions in technology-based solutions, I make my first argument 
around the construct lack/absence of trust in inter-firm interactions. I argue that trust represents a nuanced 
concept and that technological sophistication alone cannot create a complete “trust-free” solution because 
interaction between humans remains a fundamental element in every digital platform ecosystem 
(Hawlitschek et al., 2020). Thus, the way a participant perceives other participants’ trustworthiness in a 
platform becomes a critical factor in addressing lack of trust in the ecosystem. Following Mayer et al. (1995) 
and Gefen, Benbasat, and Pavlou (2008), I  argue that three characteristics decide a platform’s 
trustworthiness: 1) capability (i.e., having the knowledge, skills, or competencies that allow a participant to 
provide the desired product and services in the ecosystem), 2) integrity (i.e., adhering to a set of principles 
that the other participants find acceptable, and 3) benevolence (i.e., willingness to do good to other 
participants aside from self-fulfilling motives). Perceived social presence and sense of virtual community 
fosters these three characteristics. In other words, trust in participants’ products and services, their integrity, 
and their benevolence shapes how one perceives their trustworthiness. Thus, I propose: 
P1a:  Lack of trust in inter-firm relationships inversely relates to other participants’ perceived 
trustworthiness. 
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On the other hand, a participant’s propensity to trust lies in participant’s inherent characteristics, which its 
own experience, personal leadership traits, and organizational culture shape. Considering a large digital 
platform network with different types of participants, these two factors (i.e., the way a participant perceives 
others’ trustworthiness and a participant’s own propensity to trust) will have a compound effect that will lead 
to lack of trust in the system. Thus, I propose:  
P1b:  Lack of trust in inter-firm relationships inversely relates to a participant’s propensity to trust. 
While trust elements constitute a critical dimension that contribute to cooperative value creation and capture 
in a network, participants’ complementing value propositions also characterize a network. In this context, 
we need to recognize the servitization trend. Servitization, which began as platform as a service (PaaS) in 
the 2000s, has taken myriad shapes over the past decade andchanged the way firms cooperate and 
collaborate. Today, we essentially have “* as a service” where the asterisk stands for any business value 
proposition. For example, we can observe mining as a service, which provides services related to mining 
blockchain tokens to participants (Riasanow et al., 2018). Servitizing products/services/collaborations in this 
way not only creates new opportunities to co-create value with different partners but also creates additional 
dependencies that demand standardized protocols  with well-calibrated outcomes. Note that inter-firm 
relationships do not exist independently. They connect to one another because a given relationship not only 
affects the two partners but also affects these two partners’ other relationships. These interconnected 
relationships may result in diverse outcomes such as combination advantage, exclusivity, competition, and 
so on (Ritter, 2000). I  define this concept as value network interconnectedness and argue that a digital 
platform network tends be more interconnected and complex when participants have diverse shared goals 
and significant dependencies among them in order to create and capture value from the network. Thus, I 
propose:  
P2a:  Value network interconnectedness is directly proportional to the presence of shared goals 
among participants. 
P2b:  Value network interconnectedness is directly proportional to how much actors in the network 
depend on the network’s resources and other participants’ value-creation routines. 
Consequently, I posit that lack of trust and value network interconnectedness together drive firms to adopt 
algorithmic relationships that manifest via smart contracts. When a participant does not or only weakly trusts 
other participants and the participant also has a low propensity to trust, a utility such as a smart contract 
may enable participants to engage with other participants. I introduce the construct likelihood to adopt 
algorithmic relationship and propose:  
P3a:  Lack of trust directly influences the likelihood that a firm will adopt algorithmic relationships. 
Furthermore, one can see that perceived execution risks in inter-firm processes mediate the influence that 
lack of trust has on smart contract adoption. Following Schoorman et al. (2007), I argue that, if the risk 
associated with a specific process is high, participants in a network that lack trust in other participants will 
tend to adopt a control system, such as a smart contract, which can lower the perceived risk to a level that 
trust can manage. In other words, I propose: 
P3b:  Perceived risk in an inter-firm process mediates the influence that lack of trust has on firms’ 
likelihood to adopt algorithmic relationships. 
While lack of trust in a network calls for “trust-free” solutions for inter-firm interactions, high 
interconnectedness (i.e., low centrality and low clustering) necessitates that firms adopt algorithmic 
relationships to manage the complex web of inter-firm interactions. I present a stylized version of such 
interactions in Figure 2. In this context, we need to understand how participants proliferate in the ecosystem, 
which Figure 2 does not depict. A typical platform ecosystem not only has different types of participants that 
each bring different value propositions to the platform but also can have a high number of players under 
each type, which can lead to a vast, high-density, heterogeneous network. While a traditional digital platform 
ecosystem may have one orchestrator who drives the cooperation rules, BSEBMs would operate in a 
distributed choreography without any central monitoring agency. Such multiplicity of participants in the 
ecosystem not only increases the complexity of the network operations but also calls for higher adoption of 
automated inter-firm interactions. Thus, I propose:  
P3c:  A value network’s interconnectedness directly influences the likelihood that firms will adopt 
algorithmic relationships. 
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On the other hand, inter-firm processes’ complexity and time criticality will moderate the influence that 
network interconnectedness has on smart contract adoption. The more complex and time critical an inter-
organizational process, the higher the chances that firms will adopt smart contracts in a dense and 
interconnected network. Thus, I propose: 
P3d:  Inter-firm processes’ complexity and time criticality moderate the influence that the value 
network’s interconnectedness has on the likelihood that firms will adopt an algorithmic 
relationship. 
While lack of trust, a value network’s interconnectedness, and mediating and moderating factors explain the 
likelihood that firms will adopt algorithmic relationships, we also need to consider another key dimension: 
the platform’s and associated technologies’ familiarity. Technology familiarity reduces social or technical 
complexity (i.e., if a user is familiar with a technology, the user can address undesirable consequences that 
arise when the user or other stakeholders use it) (Söllner et al., 2016). Considering the “newness” of 
technologies such as blockchain, which firms can use to execute smart contracts, not everyone will be 
familiar with the technology, which means it may be a critical factor in whether firms adopt algorithmic 
relationships. Thus, I propose: 
P3e:  A firm’s familiarity with a platform and associated technologies directly influences the likelihood 
that it will adopt algorithmic relationships. 
4.2 Trust in Algorithmic Relationships via Implementing Smart Contracts 
If we consider the workflow in Figure 2, we see that firms can create a smart contract that designs and 
monitors participants’ interdependent activities (i.e., the activities that constitute the network’s public model). 
Such a smart contract can express information regarding transactions in a conditional format and ensure 
that all network players can explicitly see its terms and conditions. The smart contract can monitor 
participants’ transactions and deal with any deviation via its pre-designed rules, which can save time and 
potentially reduce disputes. Digital rights management (DRM) in the music industry represents a successful 
early example in which firms codified regulations. In this example, the code effectively works as law (i.e., 
the code itself enforces the law ex ante rather than a third party ex post) (De Filippi & Hassan, 2018), and 
it works more smoothly than the way legal institutions resolve copyright disputes. In other words, key smart 
contract features (i.e., accurate transactions, clear communication and transparency, speed, and efficiency) 
contribute to improving the shared value that participants in a platform ecosystem create. Thus, I propose:   
P4a:  Adopting algorithmic relationships enhances collaborative value creation and value capture. 
However, as extant research has argued (which I summarize in Table 1), smart contracts, while promising 
seamless inter-firm interactions, may have serious lacunae due to their design and implementation being 
opaque to many stakeholders. The challenges may stem from the inability to model a smart contract in 
advance that consider all possible business situations, uncertainties, and corresponding actions that 
participants would accept. For example, it may not be possible to design and codify the returns (gains and 
losses) that would appear as equitable once a contract is in force. In addition, dispute resolution through a 
smart contract would differ from that dispute resolution through a traditional legal system as one cannot 
easily transpose legal rules’ the ambiguity and flexibility into formalized language. Apart from assuring 
participants that the smart contract correctly executes process steps, algorithm designers also need to 
consider issues such as data confidentiality (i.e., they need to provide participants with selective access to 
smart contract data). The algorithm also needs to ensure process confidentiality (i.e., it needs to share only 
those information on the process activities at each participant to other participants that inter-firm cooperation 
requires). I  also recognize three considerations that affect collaborative value creation. First, participants 
may not view the claim that smart contracts offer transparency as just and fair during a contract’s period 
due to opacities that I show in Table 1 and a lack of familiarity to technology that I discuss above. In other 
words, I question the assumption that smart contracts represent a superior option based on  ethical and 
integrity dimensions. Second, governance concerns stewardship as much as it concerns regulation 
enforcement. Third, as The DAO’s failure shows, a purely algorithmic system’s governance limitations mean 
that firms in an inter-firm cooperation requires provisions for manual, off-the-chain executive interventions 
as a governance mechanism. Thus, I posit:  
P4b:  Algorithm design quality moderates the influence that algorithmic relationships have on 
collaborative value creation and value capture. 
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P4c:  Algorithmic relationship governance moderates the influence that algorithmic relationships 
have on collaborative value creation and value capture. 
Combining these perspectives, I develop a trust framework in digital platform ecosystems governed by 
autonomous and semi-autonomous smart contracts. I depict the framework through a nomological network 
diagram in Figure 3. I represent the direct relationships with solid lines and the mediating and moderating 
relationships with dotted lines. 
 
Figure 3. Trust in Digital Platform Ecosystems: Proposed Relationships 
4.3 Trust in Algorithmic Relationships Ex Post 
Lastly, following Schoorman et al. (2007) and Gefen et al. (2008), I introduce temporal dimension in the 
relationships with feedback loop that reinforces or weakens initial trust antecedents. As firms cooperate in 
a network and create and capture value, their experience influences other participants’ perspectives, their 
own propensity to trust, and their future orientation about the network in terms of shared goals or 
commitments. Such experience not only pertains to economic returns but also includes developing the 
capability to achieve future business objectives and acquiring intangible assets such as knowledge about 
processes and technology. A positive collaborative value-creation experience should contribute to the trust 
constructs that I discuss above (i.e., other actors’ perceived trustworthiness and propensity to trust). In 
addition, a positive experience and awareness of partners’ competencies improves a participant’s reliability 
on other partners’ resources and capabilities, which prompts them to create more shared goals and embed 
resources in collaborative processes. On the other hand, following Bruyaka et al. (2018), I argue that the 
probability that partners will defect from the network either due to performance issues or due unrelated 
adverse business effects can pose a concern for the leadership due to the associated sunk costs and fewer 
value-creation opportunities. I propose a construct called collaborative value-creation and value-capture 
experience that researchers can assess through the synergy and complementarity that the collaboration 
generates or fails to generate for a focal firm and its partners through inter-firm business processes. Thus, 
I propose:    
P5a:  Collaborative value-creation and value-capture experience directly influences familiarity with a 
platform and associated technology over time. 
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P5b:  Collaborative value-creation and value-capture experience directly influences other 
participants’ perceived trustworthiness. 
P5c:  Collaborative value-creation and value-capture experience directly influences participant’s 
propensity to trust. 
P5d:  Collaborative value-creation and value-capture experience directly influences whether firms 
develop shared goals. 
P5e:  Collaborative value-creation and value-capture experience directly influences a participant’s 
dependence on other participants’ resources and value-creation routines . 
Therefore, as familiarity improves over time, it directly influences the extent to which firms in inter-firm 
relationships adopt smart contracts in the future. However, we need to expand our discussion on smart 
contracts’ governance and dispute-resolution mechanisms. As Werbach (2018a) has argued, blockchain-
based immutable smart contracts may build consensus, enforce rules as designed, and create a single 
version of a system’s global state, but firms can find them difficult to understand due to their cryptographic 
method and the opacities that I discuss in Table 1. The challenge concerns creating a fair balance between 
ex ante design and ex post resolution. Firms may resolve a dispute that arises from executing a smart 
contract through “off-the-chain” intervention and arbitration, or they may reach formal legal institutions for 
resolutions, which suggests strong interplay between smart contracts and legal institutions. In other words, 
code can become more like the law and the law can become more like code (Werbach & Cornell, 2017; 
Werbach, 2018b), and, thus, both these elements can contribute to repairing trust in inter-firm business 
processes. Legal institutions can support such repair of trust by transferring regulatory requirements to the 
software-development process, by acting as gatekeepers who control and incentivize data quality, or by 
enabling and intervening in situations that require settlement (Zavolokina, Ziolkowski, Bauer, & Schwabe, 
2020). Firms can also achieve such repair of trust by pairing a smart contract that incorporates legalese 
with a modularized legal contract. Robust repair mechanisms for when a breach occurs positively influence 
trust dimensions and collaborative business dimensions. I propose a construct, trust repair, and recognize 
the moderating role it has on the experience of collaborative value creation and capture over time. Thus, I 
propose:   
P5f:  Trust repair moderates the influence that collaborative value-creation experience has on 
perceived trustworthiness. 
P5g:  Trust repair moderates the influence that collaborative value-creation experience has on 
propensity  to trust. 
P5h:  Trust repair moderates the influence that collaborative value-creation experience has on firms’ 
efforts to develop shared goals. 
P5i:  Trust repair moderates the influence that collaborative value-creation experience has on a 
firm’s dependence on other firms’ resources and value-creation routines. 
Combining these propositions, I developed the nomological network for the feedback path that I present in 
Figure 4. 
As digital platform ecosystems evolve to include more and more organizations by transforming their 
business models, we need to better understand the role of trust in such platforms (Sundararajan, 2016). We 
also need to understand how digital technologies change the facets of trust among organizations and the 
people who run them. In this paper, I comprehensively explain trust in SEBMs in which algorithmic 
relationships manifest via (centralized or decentralized) smart contacts. In doing so, I develop mechanisms 
that firms can use to co-create and capture more value and sustain such value over time. 
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Figure 4. Trust in Digital Platform Ecosystems: Proposed Temporal Relationships 
5 Conclusion and Future Research 
In this paper, I analyze how value creation in firms has evolved over time and observe that traditional vertical 
value chains in business ecosystems have begun to give way to loosely coupled coalition and multisided 
platforms and that the effectiveness of inter-firm collaboration and cooperation plays an important role in 
creating and capturing value (Osterwalder et al., 2005; Pagani, 2013). Corporations across geographic 
boundaries have begun to invest in blockchain and IoT-based solutions in digital platform ecosystems given 
that these technologies can enable their visions. However, they have used various methods to address the 
challenges associated with standards, regulations, shared governance, and building viable ecosystems 
(Lacity, 2018). However, when measured through business value creation, the resultant outcomes have 
been less encouraging possibly because we do not comprehensively understand the way in which 
technological solutions intertwine with these platform ecosystems’ human dimensions. We need to 
recognize that today’s organizations are as much digital as they are social in nature. Accordingly, in this 
paper, I develop insights into the trust dimensions that shape inter-firm interactions. 
I pose the “how” question on smart contracts and focus on some important conditions that shape the trust 
equations among network participants engaged in algorithmic relationships. I demonstrate how perception 
about other participants’ trustworthiness, a participant’s own propensity to trust, participants’ shared goals 
and resource embeddedness in the network, perceived risks in inter-firm interactions, and inter-firm 
interactions’ complexity and time criticality drive firms to adopt smart contracts. Subsequently, I propose 
that a smart contract algorithm’s design and governance moderates the eventual value co-creation and 
capture. Finally, I argue that, given the lacunae and opacity in their development and implementation stages, 
smart contracts may not help network participants increase the value they create and capture together. 
Therefore, the temporal perspective (i.e., participants’ experience over time, associated trust repair if a 
breach occurs, and legal recourse) shape participants’ willingness to trust the platform and other 
participants. I used the classical trust model (Mayer et al., 1995), the TAM (Lee et al., 2003), and the 
enhanced trust TAM (Söllner et al., 2016) to develop several propositions that capture the interplay of 
technological advances and legal frameworks in value co-creation by firms.   
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By drawing on diverse literature from organizational behavior, technology, law, and ethics, I advance our 
understanding of trust in a seemingly “trust-free” digital network. I find that, even though trust does not 
constitute a necessary initial condition for a firm to participate in a digital platform network, different trust 
dimensions contribute to enhancing shared value creation and technological implementations such as smart 
contracts reinforce these dimensions. Finding support for Hawlitschek et al. (2020), I argue that one need 
not categorize SEBMs as “trust-free” systems that position smart contracts as an alternative to trust or legal 
infrastructure. Instead, trust dimensions, smart contract technology, and the legal infrastructure should co-
exist to help firms co-create and sustain superior value. Such integration may be necessary when we 
consider that smart contract technology’s building block, black-box AI algorithms, often demonstrate poor 
explainability and transparency (Robert et al., 2020). These limitations affect all the key trust dimensions in 
inter-firm relationships—reliability, fairness, and goodwill (Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2005)—and, 
thus, influence the opportunity for value co-creation. By breaking down smart contract-adoption challenges, 
identifying the causes that lead to managerial and process issues in algorithm-based governance, and 
exploring the dichotomy about whether code should be more like the law or the law should be more like 
code, I explain the associations among important constructs that define trust in technology-enabled inter-
firm processes. The term algorithmic relationship that I develop in this paper imbeds these constructs and 
represents as a significant contribution to the literature on trust in digital platforms. Considering the rapid 
rate at which businesses across the world continue to adopt smart contracts, the algorithmic relationship 
concept should play play an important role in specifying how firms may need to collaborate and cooperate 
among themselves through inter-organizational engagement’s lifecycle stages.  
Thus, researchers need to empirically assess, define appropriate measures for, and develop hypotheses 
for the propositions that I propose in this paper. Consequently, these concepts can contribute to efforts to 
develop global standards for smart contracts in SEBMs, which researchers have identified as a key 
opportunity area for smart contracts (Chan et al., 2020). These standards may include guidelines for 
conceptualizing, designing, deploying, and governing smart contracts, which includes mechanisms for legal 
recourse. Some other critical issues that future research could explore include the perceived opacity in 
modeling and executing smart contracts and the concomitant legal recourse that pertains to disputes. We 
may require algorithm developers to follow an open development and implementation approach so that we 
can maximize algorithmic fairness and transparency to support decision making for social good (Lepri et al., 
2018). Considering the growing relevance of algorithmic relationships in inter-firm cooperation, especially 
in digital platform networks, we need to develop further insights on how smart contracts can recognize the 
role of trust in inter-firm transactions and optimize shared value creation. 
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